Security Is More Than Defence

Toward a 4D Strategy for Europe

Europe is finally discussing how much it must spend on security. It is still discussing too little what security actually means.

That distinction matters politically. If governments cannot explain why societies must invest time, energy and public money, which threats they are preparing for and what they are seeking to protect, support will eventually erode. Defence is therefore not merely a military programme or a budgetary exercise. It is also a societal story, and political leaders and the media have a responsibility to tell it honestly.

The debate is dominated by percentages: two per cent, 3.5 per cent, five per cent of GDP. It concerns procurement schedules, ammunition stocks, air-defence systems and industrial capacity. This correction was overdue. Russia’s war against Ukraine exposed the cost of European complacency, while uncertainty about the United States made clear that permanent dependence is not a strategy. A political union unable to defend itself cannot be fully sovereign.

But Europe now risks correcting one narrow view with another. More money for armed forces does not automatically produce more security. A country can buy advanced weapons while allowing its railway network, electricity grid, hospitals, public administration and political institutions to become brittle. It can increase military expenditure while cutting diplomacy, development cooperation, education or independent journalism—and thereby weaken the society those weapons are meant to protect.

Security is not a service delivered by soldiers to a passive society. It is a social contract in which public authorities, businesses, communities and citizens each sustain part of society’s ability to endure. Security is also the baker’s access to grain, the hospital’s electricity supply, the bridge designed to survive disruption and the citizen’s confidence that emergency instructions deserve to be followed. Peace and stability are costly and fragile achievements. Their protection depends on every link in the chain, and genuine collective security must be carried collectively.

This changes how Europe should judge investment. The cheapest bridge, energy system or supply chain in normal times may be the costliest when crisis arrives. Resilience may require spending more in the short term to preserve options and continuity over the long term. Quality, adaptability and durability therefore matter alongside cost and efficiency—in infrastructure, spatial planning, food supply, energy and public services.

An unbalanced build-up can also undermine its own political support. Citizens asked to accept large military budgets while diplomacy, development and essential public services are cut may conclude that security is being defined against them rather than with them. Europe’s post-war achievement was not the disappearance of power, but its embedding in law, institutions, economic interdependence and Democracy. A durable defence policy must preserve that balance.

The 2025 NATO commitment illustrates both the necessity and the limitation of the present debate. Allies agreed to work towards five per cent of GDP by 2035: at least 3.5 per cent for core military requirements and up to 1.5 per cent for wider defence- and security-related investment, including infrastructure, civil preparedness and resilience. That broader category is a welcome recognition that security extends beyond barracks. Yet a budget category is not a doctrine. It does not tell us how military power, diplomacy, development, democratic institutions and social trust should reinforce one another.

Europe needs a 4D security strategy: Defence, Diplomacy, Development and Democracy. Defence deters and resists aggression. Diplomacy prevents escalation, communicates red lines and builds coalitions. Development reduces vulnerabilities before they become emergencies. Democracy gives societies the legitimacy, trust and adaptability to withstand attack. None can replace the others. Together, they describe what Europe must defend and how it can do so without becoming a copy of the powers that threaten it.

The return of Defence

The first D cannot be evaded. Pacifism is not a shield against an aggressor who rejects peaceful coexistence. Negotiations unsupported by credible power can become an invitation to coercion, while economic interdependence does not restrain every regime. Ukraine has paid the price for assumptions that Europe should never repeat.

European states therefore need deployable forces, ammunition, air and missile defence, drones, intelligence, secure communications, logistics and military mobility. They need a defence-industrial base able to expand production during a prolonged crisis. They need greater interoperability and far more joint procurement. Fragmented national orders produce duplication, incompatible systems, higher costs and strategic dependence.

Spending is part of this, but percentages are inputs rather than outcomes. The useful questions are what capabilities Europe can field, how quickly it can reinforce an exposed member state, how long it can sustain operations, and which critical functions still depend on American intelligence, airlift, satellite support or command systems. A collection of national procurement plans does not amount to strategic autonomy.

This is why common European planning matters. The EU does not need to duplicate NATO indiscriminately, nor should it wait for a transatlantic rupture before becoming more capable. It should develop a shared threat assessment, align capability targets, deepen the existing command structures, and use common financing to reward joint procurement and European production. NATO and the EU have different strengths: NATO remains the principal framework for collective military defence, while the EU possesses regulatory, financial, diplomatic and societal instruments that NATO lacks. A stronger European pillar can reinforce both.

Defence must also obey democratic limits. Emergency procurement cannot become an excuse for secrecy without scrutiny, permanent exceptional powers or the capture of public budgets by a small group of contractors. A democracy should be able to arm itself without militarising its politics. Parliamentary oversight, transparent procurement, anti-corruption enforcement and legal accountability are security measures too.

Diplomacy is a capability

Diplomacy is easily neglected because its successes are often invisible. A battle avoided has no dramatic footage; a channel kept open during a crisis rarely produces a parade. Yet the absence of diplomacy becomes visible very quickly—in miscalculation, isolated sanctions, collapsing arms-control regimes and wars entered without an exit.

Diplomacy is not the opposite of strength and dialogue is not appeasement. Credible deterrence makes negotiation more effective; competent diplomacy ensures that deterrence does not become an escalatory machine. Europe needs expertise able to interpret other societies, communicate with adversaries, mediate where it has access, and maintain crisis channels even when normal relations have broken down.

It also needs the capacity to build coalitions beyond its familiar circle. Sanctions work better when partners prevent evasion. Support for Ukraine is stronger when Europe understands the concerns of India, Brazil, South Africa and other middle powers rather than assuming they will adopt a European reading of the world. Enlargement, trade, climate partnerships and neighbourhood policy are diplomatic instruments when used consistently, not merely administrative files.

The defence of international law belongs here as well. The United Nations and other multilateral institutions are often blocked or inadequate, but their weakness is an argument for reform and coalition-building—not for abandoning common rules altogether. Europe cannot plausibly condemn imperial aggression in one region while treating law as optional in another. Consistency is not moral decoration; it is the basis of diplomatic credibility.

Development is security before the emergency

Development cannot guarantee peace. Wealthier societies may still become authoritarian and interstate wars are not caused simply by poverty. But weak health systems, food insecurity, water stress, unemployment, corruption and climate shocks create vulnerabilities that armed groups, criminal networks and coercive states can exploit.

Development is therefore not charity appended to foreign policy. It is long-term investment in the capacity of societies to manage conflict without collapse. For Europe, that means reliable partnerships in education, public health, food and water systems, climate adaptation, energy, local governance and independent institutions—especially in its eastern and southern neighbourhoods.

This D needs protection from two distortions. First, development budgets should not be raided whenever military expenditure rises. That merely transfers costs forward: prevention is cut, instability deepens, and Europe later pays more for emergency relief, border pressure or military crisis management. Second, development should not become a euphemism for paying governments to stop migration or choose Europe over China. Partnerships built on dependency and short-term leverage reproduce the very insecurity strategic autonomy is supposed to reduce.

Ukraine again demonstrates the connection. Rebuilding energy systems, schools, homes, hospitals and municipalities is not an activity that begins after the war and sits outside security policy. It determines whether people can remain, whether the economy functions, and whether democratic government retains legitimacy under attack. Development and Defence are occurring simultaneously.

Climate resilience belongs here too. Energy dependence on imported fossil fuels exposed Europe to coercion. Distributed renewable generation, stronger grids and storage can reduce that vulnerability. Defence and climate industries also depend on many of the same critical materials, technologies and skilled workers. If policy remains divided into rival silos, they will compete destructively. Coordinated procurement, recycling, stockpiling, clean fuels and dual-use innovation can instead advance security, industrial policy and decarbonisation together.

Not every defence project is green and not every climate investment improves military readiness. The point is not to erase trade-offs but to identify genuine common interests. A resilient electricity network, secure supply chains, efficient buildings, low-carbon industrial capacity and climate-adapted infrastructure are strategic assets in peace and crisis alike.

Democracy is strategic infrastructure

The fourth D is the element conventional security debates most often treat as background. It should be at their centre.

Modern aggression does not begin only when troops cross a border. Elections are manipulated, parties financed, public databases hacked, cables sabotaged, minorities targeted with tailored propaganda and corruption used to purchase influence. The objective is often not to persuade a society of one coherent lie. It is to exhaust citizens, destroy shared standards of evidence and convince them that every institution is equally dishonest.

A state weakened in this way may possess tanks while losing the political ability to use them. Citizens who distrust public authorities will be less likely to follow emergency instructions. A corrupt procurement system will waste defence budgets. A politicised judiciary cannot reliably punish espionage or sabotage. Media deserts make communities easier to manipulate. Democratic decline is therefore not simply a values problem occurring alongside security; it is a security vulnerability.

Ukraine offers the clearest counterexample. Its military resistance has depended on civic mobilisation, volunteers, journalists, local government, digital public services and networks of mutual aid. Many of these capacities developed through reforms and social learning after 2014. Ukraine’s democracy remains imperfect and war creates grave pressures on rights and accountability, but its resilience demonstrates that citizens defend more effectively when they understand themselves as participants rather than subjects.

Democracy should not be reduced to another weapon. Its value does not depend on its usefulness in war. But democratic habits create strategic strength: open societies can expose errors, distribute initiative, mobilise voluntary cooperation and preserve legitimacy through hardship. Their apparent untidiness can be an advantage over systems in which bad news travels slowly upward and fear suppresses correction.

Europe should treat this democratic capacity as infrastructure. That means investing in independent courts and media, professional public services, secure elections, anti-corruption bodies, civic education, digital literacy and strong local government. It also means protecting the social contract. Schools, healthcare, housing and economic security are not substitutes for military defence, but extreme inequality and abandonment create openings for those who profit from resentment and polarisation.

Trust cannot be ordered into existence, and governments should be wary of turning “resilience” into a paternalistic campaign against dissent. The best defence against disinformation is not an official ministry of truth. It is a plural information environment, transparent institutions, independent research, access to public records and authorities willing to correct mistakes.

Nor can Europe credibly require candidate countries to meet the Copenhagen criteria, or defend its support for Ukraine in the language of Democracy and the Rule of Law, while allowing those same standards to erode within the Union. Consistency at home is part of Europe’s security credibility abroad.

From four budgets to one doctrine

The four Ds should not become four new spending silos. Their value lies in interaction.

Defence without Diplomacy can deter but also miscommunicate. Diplomacy without Defence may lack leverage. Development without Democracy can strengthen corrupt or authoritarian structures. Democracy without material security can lose legitimacy. Climate policy without security planning can create new dependencies; defence policy without climate planning can lock Europe into vulnerable supply chains and infrastructure.

Finland’s comprehensive-security model shows what this integration can look like in practice. Its 2025 Security Strategy for Society treats authorities, businesses, organisations and citizens as co-producers of society’s vital functions. Its security-of-supply system links public planning, private operators and strategic reserves, while national defence courses build networks across sectors before a crisis. The lesson is not that every country should copy Finland or militarise civilian life. It is that food, energy, transport, healthcare, communications and public trust already belong to the security architecture. Preparedness works best when these connections are built calmly in peacetime rather than improvised after disruption begins.

This integrated view also changes the false choice between weapons and welfare. Europe needs greater military expenditure, but financing it by hollowing out the society being defended is self-defeating. Common European borrowing, instruments such as SAFE, and a larger role for the European Investment Bank can support joint investment and reduce national fragmentation. The EIB’s present security and defence role is already expanding, although weapons and ammunition remain outside its eligible activities. Common financing should prioritise European added value: air defence, military mobility, secure communications, energy networks, civil protection, research and industrial scaling that no member state can deliver efficiently alone.

Three institutional steps would give 4D tangible form.

First, Europe should connect defence planning, industrial policy and civilian preparedness through a permanent cross-sector process. Major European infrastructure and investment decisions should undergo a resilience test covering cascading risks: how a cyberattack affects hospitals, how extreme weather affects military mobility, or how energy disruption affects democratic stability.

Second, it should create a voluntary European Citizen Resilience Service. Participants could train in emergency medicine, disaster response, cyber support, logistics, infrastructure protection and assistance to vulnerable communities. This would not be a disguised army or compulsory national service. Its purpose would be to make preparedness a shared civic experience and give citizens useful roles before and during crises.

Third, Europe should develop an Article D: a mutual-assistance framework for systemic attacks on democracy. When credible independent evidence shows coordinated foreign interference, a large cyberattack on elections, coercive capture of courts or media, or organised sabotage of constitutional government, European partners should be able to provide rapid technical, legal, cyber, financial and investigative support.

Article D must not allow a government to label opposition or protest a security threat. Activation would require transparent criteria, independent assessment, proportionality, parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review. It would complement existing EU rule-of-law mechanisms and mutual-assistance clauses rather than circumvent them. Its basic principle is simple: an attack on the democratic capacity of one member weakens the security of all.

A realistic peace policy

The 4D doctrine also offers a way beyond the sterile opposition between militarism and pacifism. A realistic pacifism begins with the prevention of conflict through cooperation, law, diplomacy and development. It treats force as a last resort and insists on civilian protection, proportionality and accountability. But it recognises that refusing to resist aggression can abandon others to violence rather than prevent violence.

Preparing for peace therefore includes preparing to defend the conditions under which peace is possible. It also requires arms control, risk reduction and renewed efforts to limit weapons whose speed or destructive power outruns meaningful human control. Military strength should serve a political strategy aimed at restoring a lawful peace, not become a permanent identity or a substitute for one.

Europe’s strategic autonomy should follow the same logic. Autonomy does not mean autarky, neutrality or separation from allies. It means the capacity to choose and act without paralysing dependence. Europe should not imitate Russia’s fusion of regime survival and national security, nor reproduce the global military posture of the United States. Its comparative strength lies in law, pluralism, social protection, negotiated government and the ability to turn interdependence into rules.

Those qualities can make decision-making slower. They can also make a society more durable. The answer is not to strip democracy away in search of speed, but to improve European decision-making while preserving legitimacy and accountability.

What Europe is defending

The present defence debate is necessary. Europe spent too long assuming that economic weight, American protection and the memory of past wars would insulate it from power politics. That era has ended.

But sovereignty cannot be measured in tanks alone. A Europe able to intercept missiles but unable to keep hospitals functioning, elections credible, energy affordable or citizens informed would not be secure. Nor would a Europe rich in social programmes but incapable of deterring conquest.

The purpose of the 4D strategy is not to dilute Defence. It is to place Defence inside a more demanding conception of security. Military power protects the space in which democratic life can continue. Diplomacy reduces the number of crises that reach the battlefield. Development strengthens societies before emergency becomes collapse. Democracy gives all three legitimacy and endurance.

Europe must be able to defend its borders. It must also remain worth defending within them.

Principal sources

· NATO’s 2025 Hague commitment consists of at least 3.5% of GDP for core defence requirements and up to 1.5% for broader defence- and security-related spending by 2035. In July 2026 NATO estimated that five Allies would meet the 3.5% guideline in 2026 and seventeen the 1.5% guideline. Source: NATO, Defence investment and NATO’s 5% commitment and Defence Investment Update.

· SAFE is an EU loan instrument with an envelope of up to €150 billion for strategic defence investment and greater joint procurement. It is financed through EU borrowing. Sources: European Commission and Council of the EU.

· The EIB now finances dedicated military equipment, infrastructure, services and technologies, but excludes weapons and ammunition. Source: European Investment Bank, Strengthening Europe’s security and defence industry.

· Sauli Niinistö’s Safer Together report contains approximately eighty recommendations and argues for combined civilian and military preparedness and a whole-of-society approach. Source: European Commission.

· Finland’s comprehensive-security model is documented in the Finnish Government’s 2025 Security Strategy for Society. Security-of-supply arrangements are described by the National Emergency Supply Agency, and the cross-sector national defence courses by the Finnish National Defence University and Security Committee.

· The seven areas of convergence between climate and defence - electrification, clean fuels, procurement, industrial conversion, raw materials, innovation and preparedness - are drawn from Simone Tagliapietra, Bruegel, Defence and climate: seven points for a common agenda (28 April 2025), supplied with the source materials.